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Macroeconomics has undergone a revolution in 
the past 20 years, in which significant challenges 
have been made to supposedly well-established 
theories and facts. Among the most important of 
these prevailing theories is the positive correla- 
tion between money and real output. 
Traditionally, most economists and policy- 
makers have interpreted this correlation to imply 
that Federal Reserve open market operations 
could affect real output. This interpretation has 
persisted in spite of weak and sometimes con- 
tradictory empirical evidence. Unfortunately, we 
cannot attempt to examine all of the existing 
eviclence on the direction of causality between 
money and output. Instead, this paper emmines 
whether Granger-causality is a valid test for cau- 
sality and what can be inferred from existing tests 
of Granger-causality.  The ansmTers to these ques- 
tions are of  paramount importance, since most 
policynlakers assume that money causes output 
in a consistent and reliable way. This correlation 
is illustrated in figures 1,2,  and 3 using three 
measures of money: base, MI, and M2.I 
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The usual method of distinguishing among 
competing economic theories involves econo- 
metric testing. However, as is well known (see, 
for example, Black [I9821  ),  econometric models 
indicate correlation, but not causality. Even the 
econometric technique of Granger (1969) does 
not necessarily identify causality as the term is 
commonly understood. We will show in the fol- 
lowing section that the concept of Granger- 
causality is not robust to changes in the underly- 
ing model of the economy.2 In other words, it is 
impossible to interpret Granger-causality inde- 
pendent of theory. Given this, sections I1 
through IV examine models that try to explain 
the correlation between money and output. 
Traditionally, this correlation was explained by 
assuming some type of nominal rigidity (either 
prices or wages). Tobin (1970), however, 
showed that the correlation between money and 
output could be a result of the Federal Resen~e's 
operating procedure and that it did not necessar- 
ily imply that changes in money caused output 
changes. Section I11 shows that if  the Federal 
Resenre accommodates increases in output with 
a corresponding increase in the money supply, 
I  The  series is detrended using a  Hodrick and Prescott  (1980) filter 
Figure 4  ~llustrales  this method as il is applied to real output (GNP).  Pi4  2  See  also Cooley and  LeRoy (1985) 
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Best available copythen one would expect to observe a positive 
correlation between output and money even 
though money is not causing output. 
Real business cycle theorists have recently 
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argued that the correlation between money and 
output could be due to reverse causality; that is, 
output can cause money independent of the 
Federal Reserve's reaction function. Section IV 
examines a model by King and Plosser (1784) 
showing that M1  and output are correlated 
because increases in real output cause increases 
in the demand for financial intermediation. This 
increased demand leads to the expansion of 
broader monetary measures, such as M1  and M2, 
even though changes in money have no influ- 
ence on real output. 
Section V reviews the empirical evidence 
uncovered in these theories to help ascertain the 
direction of causality in the money-output corre- 
lation. Section VI concludes with a discussion of 
policy implications. 
NOTE: Sample period is from 19i9:1~  to 1988:n'~.  I.  granger-Ca~aiiQ 
SOC'RCB:  Resources, Inc., and  Board  of Governors of  the  Federal 
Resene System.  Causality is a very elusive concept. In practice, 
most people define x causing y to mean that a 
change in x leads to a change in y  As an anal- 
om,  we would imvlicitlv assume that if  we could  <,,  , 
cause a low-pressure system to appear over a city 
(all else remaining constant), then there would 
be a high probability that rain would fall. This 
causality usually means that if low-pressure sys- 
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tems cause rain, then low-pressure systems must 
precede rain. 
As can be seen in figure 3, M2  appears to lead 
GNP. Does this chronology imply that M2  causes 
GNP? The Granger definition of causality 
requires two assun~ptions.  As stated by Granger 
and Newbold (1986, p. 220): 
a) The future cannot cause the past. Causality 
can only occur with the past causing the present 
or future. 
b) A cause contains unique infornlation about 
an effect that is not available elsewhere. 
According to the first assumption, then, if  M2 
always leads changes in GIN',  we can logically 
infer that GNP does not cause M2. Does this 
mean that we can conclude the alternative, that 
M2  causes GNP? Consider the following example. 
Suppose that a group of individuals always 
listens to weather forecasts and that these fore- 
casts are always accurate. Further, suppose that 
these people decide to carry umbrellas on days 
that rain is forecasted. Clearly, carrying an 
umbrella and rain will be correlated, and carry- 
ing an umbrella will precede a rainstorm. 
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According to the first assumption of Granger- 
causality, rain cannot cause umbrella-carrying. 
Yet, clearly, meteorologists would reject the con- 
clusion that umbrellas cause rain. 
The problem with our umbrella and rain 
example is that assumption a) is violated. This 
assumption is also frequently violated in many 
econometric tests. A third variable that uniquely 
causes people to carry umbrellas is omitted. 
Strictly speaking, rain does not cause umbrellas, 
but the ezpectation that rain may occur causes 
people to carry umbrellas. Ekpectations are not 
formed in a vacuum, however; low-pressure sys- 
tems in this example could be shown to cause 
both umbrella-carrying and rain. Neglecting this 
third variable would cause one to conclude that 
carrying an umbrella Granger-causes rain. 
Because of the importance of expectations in 
economics, a variable, x, that precedes another 
variable, y,  will frequently not cause JJ,  Variable 
x may depend on the expected value of y, caus- 
ing x and y  to be correlated. Since expectations 
depend on numerous variables that are, in prin- 
ciple, observable by the econometrician, one 
could conceivably conduct a Granger-causality 
test by including all relevant variables. The econ- 
ometrician, however, would need to have a well- 
defined model of how expectations are formed. 
It is therefore extremely important that Granger- 
causality tests be interpreted in light of the theory 
that one is trying to test. 
Consider the formal definition of Granger- 
causality. Let  R,  be all the information available 
in the universe at time t.  Let  x,  and y, be two 
random variables within this universe. Granger 
says that x causes (does not cause) y  if 
for k > 1, where F (.  I .) is the conditional prob- 
ability density function of y,  + ,  given R,  or R, 
- x,,  and R,  - x, is defined to be the universe 
less x,  . 
Suppose that these conditional distribution 
functions are equal. If x and y  are correlated, it 
follows that there must exist a third variable in 
R,  that causes both x and JI.  For example, let 
JJ  denote the occurrence of rain and let x de- 
note the occurrence of umbrella-carrying. Leav- 
ing umbrella-carrying out of the information set 
does not affect the conditional distribution of 
rain or, in other words, weathermen can accu- 
rately predict rain without seeing whether peo- 
ple are carrying unlbrellas. Because the entire 
universe, including low-pressure systems, is 
assumed to be in the information set, this exam- 
ple correctly predicts that umbrella-carrying does 
not Granger-cause rain. 
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identical to the concept of exogeneity. In other 
words, x Granger-causes  .)I  if  x  is exogenous to 
j' and 3'  is not exogenous to x. A variable x is 
exogenous to 31  if  the cxcurrence of x is inde- 
pe~iclent  of the occurrence of  jl.  Similarly, a liar- 
iable y is not exogenous to x  if  the occurrence 
of y  is dependent on x  cxcurring. Tlius, the 
occurrence of rain is exogenous to wliether 
people cany unibrellas: rain will fall regardless 
of whether people carry umbrellas. Tlie converse 
is not true, however; if it starts to rain, people 
will te~id  to carry umbrellas. 
At  first glance, Granger-causality or exogeneity 
seems to be a reasonable definition of causality. 
However, it ignores the case of bivariate causal- 
ity, where two variables cause each other. For 
example, rain causes puddles, and the evapora- 
tion of puddles causes rain to fall at a later date. 
To make Granger-causality opel-ational,  the uni- 
verse of information must be restricted and the 
nioments of the conditional distribution func- 
tions ~iiust  be tested for equality. The universe of 
information is restricted by theory. In practice, 
the distribution functions are saicl to be equal if 
their first moments (the means) are equal. Test- 
ing for Granger-causality usually involves tlie fol- 
lowing: A variable x is said to Granger-cause 
(not Granger-cause) j1  with respect to the 
information set 1, if 
Because we do  not co~isicler  all tnoments of 
the distribution, and we do  not use all of the 
inforn~ation  set, Granger-causality as practiced is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to 
determine the direction of causation between x 
and J! 
Consider the case where all the relevant 
information i~i  the universe is included in a 
Granger-causality test, but only the riieans are 
tested to see if they are eclual. If the Ineans were 
found to be unequal, then one could logically 
infer that x must cause ji If the means miere 
founcl to be equal, however, then one could not 
infer that x did not cause j! 
Now consider the second assumption in the 
case where all tlie moments can be tested, but 
the universe of information is restricted in an ad 
hoc manner and an important cleterniinant of jj 
is accide~itally  omitted. Equality between the 
conditional distribution functio~ls  necessarily 
iniplies that x  does not cause JJ. I-Iowever, if  the 
conditional distributions are not eclial, then we 
cannot infer that x causes j~.  This is the case in 
our example: umbrellas help to preclict rain a~icl 
thus Granger-cause rain if  lomi-pressure systeriis 
are excluded from the information set. 
Since any operational test of a~usality  i11voh.e~ 
restricting both the moments of the distribution 
fi~nctions  to be testecl and the information set in 
the universe rele\.ant to  the problem, employing 
a Granger-causalit). test exposes one to the risk 
of incorrectly rejecting causality ahen  it is pres- 
ent and incorrectly rejecting the assumption of 
no  causality when causality is not present. The 
econometrician can seek the clirection of causal- 
ity using a Granger-c~usality  test only by using 
theor). to cietermine n~hich  variables are helpful 
in predicting )I,+&  . Howe\.er, even after choosing 
~~riables  based on some theo~y,  a specification 
test should be conducted to help ensure tliat 
iniportant variables have not been omittecl. 
It should be clear from this cliscussion that 
Granger-causality is neither a necessary nor a suf- 
ficient test for the existence of true causality. 
First, if  hidirectional causality exists, then 
Granger-causality cannot i~iclicate  the presence of 
ausality.  Second, even when bidirectional cau- 
sality is not present, the Granger-causality test 
may fail to iclentik whether causality is present if 
the information set excludes relevant variables or 
if all moments of tlie conclitional distributions 
are not tested for equality. I11 adclitio~~,  Granger- 
causality is 11ot  a ~iseful  test for showxing the 
presence of conteri~poratieous  causality. 
Sections 11 and 111  present representative theo- 
ries that have been developed to explain the 
money-output correlation. Section W then inter- 
prets the econometric evidence tliat has been 
uncovered in light of these theories and the 
problenis discussecl above. 
IB.  Money Causes Output 
lost  economists currently favor the interpreta- 
tion that Inonejr  causes output. They believe that 
some nominal rigidities, or price/wvage  sluggish- 
ness, allow changes in nominal variables, like 
money, to have real effects. These rigitlities call 
be motivatecl by nominal wage contracts 
(Fischer  [ 19771, Gm!.  [ 19761 ), or by incomplete 
information ( Lucas  [ 1972, 19771 ). 
For expositional ease, we consider the nomi- 
nal wage contracting moclel as ese~nplifiecl  by 
Fischer. 111  his moclel, agents in the economy 
have rational (tnodel-consiste~~t)  expectations, 
but wages are "sticky" because of the existence 
of long-term ~lominal  nTage  contracts. Further, 
Fischer assumes that employment is clemand- 
determined; that is, employment is always 
chosen so that the real wmge  is equal to the mar- 
ginal 17roductit.ity of labor. Thus, changes in the 
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the contract ~ms  signed will have real effects. 
I!nanticipatecl increases in the money supply 
will cause prices to be higher than expected ancl 
will cause the real wage to be lower than 
expected. *The clecline in  the real mge  lo~vers 
the marginal cost for firms to hire aclclitional 
workers. leacling to an expansion of employment 
and thus output. 
Consider a scaled-down version of the model 
analyzed by FIoehn ( 1788). In this esample, con- 
tracts will not he overlap~ing,  and the only 
source of  ~~ncertainty  m~ill  be from the money 
supply process. A~sunie  that tlie aggregate pro- 
duction f~~nction  is Cobb-Do~~glas,  that is, >', 
= N;', where  Y,  and A',  are real output and the 
labor supply, respectively. Because mges  are 
assumeci to be detiiand-deter~~li~iect,  we set the 
real wage equal to tlie marginal productivity of 
capital. Taking logarithms gives 
where  ztl,, p,  , and  12, are the natural logarithms 
of  wages, prices, and employ~nent.  Iabor supply 
is assumed to be of the following form: 
(2)  )I',  =  + PI(  10,  - p, ) for pO,  p,  >  o 
Setting lahor supply eclual to labor demand, 
one can solve for the real wage rate that clears 
the tnarket  From tliis ecluation, it is assumed 
that wages are chosen so that the labor ~narket 
clears on a[.erage.j This gives the following 
ecluation for nominal wages: 
where  J=  [l+p,(l  -r)] 
To close the moclel, n7e  must postt a fort71 fat 
mone!  tlemC~:tnd  and money supply  >Ioiiey cle 
rnand IS taken to be the stmple cluantit) equatton, 
tliat 15,  l\fcl  =  KP,l , In logarithmic form, it IS 
For our purposes, tth~s  year's log of  mone) 
supply 1s  eclual to last year's money suppl!  pl~~s 
'1  ranclorn shock That  IS, HI',  = nz,  ,  + t,  , 
where the shocli c, is assumed to be an inde 
pendently, ~clent~cally  d~st~~butecl  ranclom 1:1na 
ble oler time  W~th  these assumptions, output 
ccl~als 
where A  = y[PO  + N Ibz (y)]~. 
For tliis simple case, in  which contracts do  not 
ol.erlap and there are no  shocks other than those 
to the moneJr  suppl)., changes in  output depend 
only on the shock to this period's money. e,  . If 
one were to ranciomly cletem~ine  different reali- 
zations of  r,  , anti were then to graph money 
su~q>Iy  ancl output against time (different realiz~l- 
tions of  c, ), one would obtain a picture t.er). 
similar to that gi~.en  in figure 1. In this case, 
money causes changes in output. t Ionet.er, 
because ch:unges  in  money ancl output occur 
contem~~o'aneo~isly,  money does not Graiiger- 
cause output. 
Equation (5) is also the output equation that 
results from a simple linearized version of the 
Lucas (1772, 1777) model. Here, workers con- 
fuse nominal and real shocks. Unanticipated 
increases in money result in higher nominal 
wages, which workers confuse with higher real 
wages. They do not know the extent to which 
higher wages reflect an increase in the relative 
price of their product or an increase in the gen- 
eral price level. Unanticipated changes in the 
money supply will cause increases in output as 
workers rationally mistake this nominal shock for 
a change in their real wage. 
Models of the type discussed above were orig- 
inally developed in response to the lack of 
empirical and theoretical support for traditional 
Keynesian and monetarist models. Both the 
Lucas and the Fischer models have recently 
come under attack. Barro (1777) shows tliat con- 
tracting models such as Fischer's are inconsistent 
with maximizing behavior. He argues that there 
is no a priori reason why labor should be 
demand-determined in these models. 
In addition, econotnists question why firms 
have not indexed their wages, because sticky 
wages result in alleged output swings at both the 
firm and the macro level. Ahmed (1787) also 
presents empirical evidence showing that nomi- 
nal wage contracting is not important for explain- 
ing output movements in Canadian data. Although 
Lucas' model is consistent with maximizing 
behavior, it also lacks empirical support. Mishkin 
(1983) and Boschen and Grossinan (1782), for 
example, find evidence against the equilibriu~n 
monetav explanation of the business cycle. 
The following section shows why tlie Federal 
Reserve's operating procedure may cause money 
and output to be correlated. 
B 3  Actually, this assumption is not quite true. Wages in Hoehn's model 





Best available copyBBil.  Post  HOE: 
Does The  Federal Resewe 
Cause Christmas? 
Figure 5 plots a scatter diagram of quarterly 
changes in the monetary base versus quarterly 
changes in output. Fourth-quarter points gener- 
ally lie to the northeast of the first- through third- 
quarter points. Therefore, money and output are 
both higher on average in the fourth quarter, or 
around Christmastime. One could erroneously 
conclude that Federal Reserve policy causes hol- 
iday spending. 
Clearly, causality in this case goes the other 
way. Output increases in the fourth quarter be- 
cause of holiday spending, and the Federal 
Reserve, attempting to remove the seasonality 
from the interest-rate series, accommodates this 
higher output by increasing the money supply. 
This is an example of a point given by Tobin 
(1970) in his seminal article, "Money and 
Income: Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc?" meaning 
"after this therefore because of it." Tobin's 
argument was that a positive correlation between 
money and output may be the result of the Fed- 
eral Reserve's operating procedure and not a 
reflection of the common belief that money 
causes output. 
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Instead of presenting Tobin's model, we show 
how the operating procedure of the Federal 
Reserve can cause one to incorrectly conclude 
that the Federal Reserve causes, or at least influ- 
ences, business cycles. Consider the following 
variation of the model presented in the previous 
section: Let output be Cobb-Douglas, so that the 
log of real wages will again be given by equation 
(1). Further, assume that the log of the labor 
supply is given by the following equation: 
forPo,P,,P2>0. 
This equation differs from equation (2) be- 
cause the labor supply is also assumed to be 
influenced by the real interest rate, r,. Equation 
(6) assumes that the labor supply depends posi- 
tively on the real interest rate, because of the 
intertemporal substitution effect. That is, when 
interest rates are high, workers transfer consump- 
tion from today until tomorrow to take advantage 
of the high real rate. Consumption is reduced, 
thus increasing the marginal utility of consump- 
tion in the current period. This, in turn, increases 
the incentive for agents in the economy to work 
additional hours in order to consume more today. 
Instead of assuming that there are long-term 
nominal wage contracts, this model assumes that 
wages vary to clear the market continuously so 
that money does not influence output. By  equat- 
ing the real wage in equations (1) and (5), we 
solve for the equilibrium amount of labor sup- 
plied (demanded) in this economy: 
Real interest rates in the economy are 
assumed to fluctuate randomly around a con- 
stant mean r : 
Temporary changes in interest rates, 7,  , can 
result because of either shifting tastes or tempor- 
ary changes in government expenditures. Incor- 
porating this variable into equation (7), we see 
that output depends positively on the innovation 
in real interest rates today. 
To close the model, we assume that money 
demand is given by equation (4) and that the 
Federal Reserve follows a nominal interest rate 
rule: 
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where  R, =  r, + E,p, + , - p, . 
Nominal interest rates are assumed to be the 
sum of the real rate plus expected inflation over 
the next period. Using equations (4),  (8), (7), 
and (lo), the reduced form for the nominal 
interest rate is given by the following equation: 
Innovations in the real interest rate are 
assumed to be temporary. An increase in the real 
interest rate causes policymakers to expand the 
money supply in order to stabilize nominal 
interest rates. Prices are then temporarily high 
and deflation is expected over the next period, 
which will offset the increase in the real interest 
rate. When A  approaches infinity, the nominal 
interest rate approaches the long-term real inter- 
est rate, r.  That is, when A  approaches infinity, 
the Federal Reserve is following an interest-rate 
Peg. 
From equation (1  1 ), the reduced form of the 
money-supply equation is given by 
The above model illustrates how an interest- 
rate target can produce a positive correlation 
between money and output. The example was 
extremely simple and predicted that money and 
output would move contemporaneously. One 
could likewise construct examples in which 
money leads changes in output and would thus 
appear to cause changes in output. 
For example, consider an economy in which 
money has no real effects, but in which agents 
are able to predict future output. The prospect of 
higher future output will cause agents to borrow 
(or save less) in an attempt to smooth their con- 
sumption stream over time. This increased bor- 
rowing will boost interest rates. If  the effect on 
output today from an increase in interest rates is 
negligible, then changes in money will occur be- 
fore changes in output when the Federal Reserve 
pursues an interest-rate peg. In this economy, 
rnoney leads, but does not cause, output. 
The next section discusses another mecha- 
nism in which output can cause changes in 
money. Unlike the model presented in this sec- 
tion, the mechanism will not come from the 
Federal Reserve's operating procedure, but will 
result from the public's willingness to hold cur- 
rency versus either demand or time deposits. 
(12)  ms, = b + A[(l/(l + A)) 
IV.  Output Causes Menay 
If  one were to randomly determine different 
realizations of  v,  , and were then to graph 
money supply and output against time (different 
realizations of  ,  ), one would again obtain a 
picture very similar to that given in figure 1.  A 
temporary increase in interest rates causes peo- 
ple to supply more labor today. This occurs 
since high real interest rates imply that, on the 
margin, individuals greatly value consumption 
today, causing them to work longer hours today. 
The increase in interest rates also causes the 
Federal Reserve to expand the money supply in 
order to smooth nominal interest rates, which 
causes a temporary rise in prices. 
This example implies that, on average, prices 
will fall over the next period, leading to a 
decline in the nominal interest rate. Unlike the 
example given in the previous section, interest 
rates in this model cause changes in both output 
and money. Thus, money and output are posi- 
tively correlated. Like the example given in sec- 
tion 111, however, interest rates do not Granger- 
cause output, because interest rates and output 
occur contemporaneously. 
Real business cycle theorists typically assume 
that the cause of business cycles is either a shock 
to consumer preferences or a shock to real pro- 
d~ctivity.~  Because an indirect measure of these 
shocks can be obtained through the use of 
Solow residuals (see Solow [ 17561 ), theorists 
have tended to concentrate on technology 
shotks as a source of business cycle fluctuations. 
Real business cycle theory has been successful 
in explaining the quantitative aspects of business 
cycles. These include the standard deviations 
of-and comovements among-real variables 
such as output, investment, consumption, and 
hours worked. In contrast, monetary-driven bus- 
iness cycle nlodels have concentrated on 
explaining the qualitative aspects of the correla- 
tion between rnoney and output.5 
Because real business cycle models do not 
include a role for money, they have been criti- 
cized for not explaining the comovements 
a 4  For a thoughtful expos~tion  of real business cycles, see Prescotl (1986) 
or  Stockman (1988). 
B8  S  As  noted by Stockman (1988. p.  35). "The large-scale economelric 
models do not qualify because they are not true structural models in the sense 
of  the Lucas critique of  econometric policy evaluation  ...." 
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among nominal variables such as the price level, 
wages, and money (see Summers [I7861  ). How- 
ever, as figure 6 and table 1 illustrate, the 
comovements among interest rates, prices, and 
real output are qualitatively consistent with real 
business cycle theory. In particular, interest rates 
have been contemporaneously prcqclical and 
prices have been countercyclical since 1757.6 
6  mior lo 1953,  prices seem lo be more procyclical. 
System. 
Procyclical interest rates arise in real business 
cycle models generated by temporary productiv- 
ity shocks. A temporary increase in productivity 
today, which is expected to lead to higher out- 
put in the future, causes individuals to borrow 
money in order to smooth consumption. Coun- 
tercyclical prices arise in these models because 
the demand for real money balances increases 
when output increases. Assuming that the Fed- 
eral Reserve does not fully accornmochte the 
increases in interest rates and output, it follows 
that prices must fall. 
Table 1 provides further evidence that the 
Federal Reserve may accommodate increases in 
output. Note that the strongest correlations 
between the monetary base and output occur 
contemporaneously and with money lagging out- 
put by one quarter. Real business cycle theorists 
argue that the correlation between the monetary 
base and output is the result of the Federal 
Resenre's operating procedure. They point out 
that this correlation is small relative to the corre- 
lation between output and broader measures of 
money, such as M1  and M2. 
Table 1 shows that while the contemporaneous 
correlation between the monetary base (percent 
deviations Erom  trend) and real GNP is only .44, 
the correlation between M2 (percent deviations 
from trend) and real GNP two quarters later is 
.68. Although table 1 indicates that the correlation 
between MI  and real GNP is similar to the corre- 
lation between the monetary base and real GNP, 
the correlation between M1 (percent deviations 
from trend) and real GNP is .59 if  one ignores 
the tremendous increase in M1 during 1986. 
While the monetary base is determined solely 
by the Federal Reserve, components of M1  and 
M2, such as checking accounts, short-term time 
deposits, money market accounts, and mutual 
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the public.'  This suggests an impostant role for 
reverse causality. The public appears to respond 
endogenously to future output changes by shift- 
ing its portfolio from currency to dernancl and 
time deposits. Some mechanism must therefore 
senre  to link output and deposits. 
King and Plosser (1984) develop a model in 
which individuals demand both cussenq7 and 
financial senlices (demand deposits). 111 their 
model, demand deposits, like other goods, are 
producecl with capital and labor. They derive a 
de~na~ld  cunre  for both inside nloney (financial 
services) and outside money (currency). They 
assume that the cost of making a transactio~~ 
clepends negatively on the real amount of  inside 
ancl outside money that a person holds. The 
cle~l~and  for both financial services and currency 
increases with real output in this model, explain- 
ing why empirically both real currency and real 
clema~ld  deposits are correlated with real output. 
However, King and Plosser also show empiri- 
cally that there is a positive correlation between 
nominal demand cleposits anci cur~ency  with real 
output. If  one restricts their cost of transactions 
and assumes that with larger purchases (higher 
output) there is an extra cost asstx-iated with 
currency over demand deposits, one can also 
generate a positive correlatio~l  between nominal 
dernand deposits and output. This assumptio~l 
seems natural because the demand for high- 
ticket durable goods is much more prtxyclical 
than for less-expensive purchases such as serv- 
ices. A model like this can explain the positive 
correlation between nominal bank deposits and 
real GNP. 
An example of reverse causality occurred dur- 
ing the Great Depression. The monetary base 
grew slightly through the period, while the 
money supply, defined ly  MI, declined substan- 
tially as depositors shifted out of demand depos- 
its and into currency. The result was a decline in 
the currency/deposit ratio as output fell ancl 
banks failed. The ensuing bank failures were 
probably both a cause and an effect of the Great 
Depression. The decline in the money supply, 
therefore, was partly the effect of factors that 
causeci the Great Depression, although it map 
also have been a contributing factor in causing 
the financial collapse.8 Empirical work has not 
been able to clistinguish this causation. 
B4  7  The Federal Reserve cunently can control the nonbonowed monetaly 
base  wilh a fair amount of prec~sion.  However, to control total monetary base, 
the  Federal Reserve would need to alter the current administrative practices of 
the discount window and reserve accounting practices. See  Laurent  (19i9). 
P  8  See  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
Real business cycle rnodels have generated a 
resurgence in interest to test for the direction of 
causality between money and output. The next 
section reviews this literature in light of the the- 
ories presented in sections I through IV. 
V.  Bests  of  the Money- 
Output Relationship 
To determine the direction of causality between 
money and output, economists since Si~lls 
(1972) have employed Granger-causality tests. 
The results of these tests are not robust to 
changes in the sarnple period, to changes in the 
variables included in the test, or to whether the 
data are in log-level or first-differenced form. 
Sims finds that money Granger-causes output 
in a simple bivariate setting. In a later paper, 
Sims (1980) determines that money fails to 
Granger-cause output when the commercial 
paper rate is includecl in the test. Litterman and 
Weiss (1985) replicate this result and also show 
that the nominal commercial paper rate Granger- 
causes both n1oney and output. They find that 
the real interest rate, however, does not Granger- 
cause either output or money. 
Eichenbaurn and Singleton (1986) replace the 
comn~ercial  paper rate with the real rate of 
return on stocks and the real rate of  return on 
Treasury bills in their Granger-causality tests. 
They find that while the real rate of return on 
Treasury bills does not Granger-cause output, the 
real rate of return on stocks does. Their model 
allows no explanatosy power for money once 
these variables are included. 
Stork and Watson (1989) find that money 
Granger-causes output if the rate of return on 
stocks is omitted and the nominal rate of return 
on Treasury bills is included. Friedman and 
Kuttner (1989), however, find that this result is 
sensitive to the sample period chosen. They also 
determine that money fails to Granger-cause 
output (except for one subsample) when the 
~lominal  commercial paper rate is replacect by 
the spread between the comn~ercial  paper rate 
and the Treasury bill rate. 
What do  these results tell us about the clirec- 
tion of causality between motley and output? 
First, the i~lclusion  of interest sates seems to 
weaken the explanatory power of money. This 
seems to be inconsistent with a monejr-driven 
business cycle. McCallum (1983), however, 
argues (but does not show) that if the Federal 
Reserve attempts to peg the interest rate, then 
interest-rate innovations are a better indication of 
the influence of Inoney on output than are 
monetaq7 innovations. This result is obtained 
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also cause interest rates to change. There are also 
nonmonetary shocks that cause interest rates to 
change, leading to changes in output. 
Second, different measures of the rate of 
return yield drastically different results. The rea- 
son is probably that some rates of return are a 
better proxy for future changes in output than 
others. As Friedman and Kuttner indicate, the 
primary determinant of the spread between the 
Treasury bill rate and the commercial paper rate 
is the default risk on corporate securities. The 
primary determinant of the default risk of corpo- 
rate securities is probably the anticipation of 
future business conditions, that is, future changes 
in output. The real rate of return on stocks in 
Eichenbaum and Singleton's study is probably 
also a proxy for future changes in output. 
The issue of whether money is significant in 
its ability to predict future output when the 
spread or return on stocks is included in the 
causality test tells us little about the actual direc- 
tion of causality between money and output. 
Money will Granger-cause output whether 
money actually causes output or whether future 
output causes money, whenever the spread (or 
the return on stocks) is a proxy, but an imperfect 
proxy for future output. Money would appear to 
be significant for both models because it helps 
to eliminate some of the noise present in the 
spread. Similarly, money will not Granger-cause 
output if the spread (or the return on stocks) is a 
perfect proxy for future output. The two models, 
money causing output and output causing 
money, are thus observationally equivalent in 
their predictions concerning whether money 
Granger-causes output. 
This analysis indicates that inferences about 
the direction of causality between money and 
output cannot be made from the existing 
Granger-causality tests. One of the major prob- 
lems with the existing empirical studies is that 
they use M1  as their measure of money. As indi- 
cated in the previous sections, broader measures 
of  money respond to future business conditions 
more than narrow measures of  money, such as 
the monetary base. It appears that it would be 
difficult to distinguish between money causing 
output or output causing money when measures 
of  money containing endogenous components 
are used. The same caveat holds for narrow meas- 
ures of money like the monetary base. These 
measures, however, do not seem to respond to 
future business conditions to the same degree as 
M1  or M2. 
These results suggest that the use of causality 
tests should proceed along the lines indicated by 
Sims (  1989). He urges that researchers should 
concentrate on combining the theoretical tech- 
niques developed by real business cycle theo- 
rists and the empirical technique of vector auto- 
regressions. That is, researchers should proceed 
along the lines of Prescott (1986), but should 
compare more than simple correlations when 
matching simulated data to actual data. Sims 
recommends that they compare the results of 
Granger-causality tests run on both simulated 
data and actual data. This requires models to 
pass stricter empirical tests before being judged 
as either successful or unsuccessful. Applying 
this technique to help determine the direction of 
causality between money and output would 
require building a real business cycle model 
with money and then comparing the vector auto- 
regressions run on simulated data from both 
models with actual data. 
This paper has shown that Granger-causality tests 
alone cannot settle the debate about the direc- 
tion of causality between money and output. 
One reason is the ever-present problem of a 
potentially missing third variable. In section I, 
we showed how umbrellas could Granger-cause 
rain when a variable proxying for the expecta- 
tion of rain, low-pressure systems, is excluded 
from the tests. The above studies seem to affirm 
the notion that leaving out variables that proxy 
for the expectation of future output could leave 
money with explanatory power when no causal- 
ity is actually present. It should be clear that this 
debate is not likely to be settled on the basis of 
Granger-causality tests alone. Unfortunately,  the 
issue can probably never be completely settled 
without having the Federal Reserve conduct con- 
trolled experiments with monetary policy that 
would be infeasible. 
Causality tests are not necessarily useless, 
however. They may provide some information 
about the direction of causality, as long as they 
are interpreted within the confines of a model. 
That is, we must start with the null hypothesis 
that a specific model is correct and attempt to 
test whether or not we can reject this hypothesis. 
This approach is in the spirit of Eichenbaum and 
Singleton (1986); however, the suggestions 
made by Sims (1989) seem more appropriate. 
Many policymakers currently assume that 
money causes output in a consistent and reliable 
way. Economists have been unable to demon- 
strate this relationship, however. If  money does 
not cause output, are policies predicated on 
such causation benign or harmful?  At  first glance, 
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would be benign if money does not cause output. 
However, by not being able to pin down the 
direction of causality, we cannot rule out other 
possibilities. For instance, it may be possible that 
infkatio~~  or Inonetanr  gromh decreases output. 
Support for this proposition comes from Kor- 
mendi and Meguire (1985). Using cross-country 
data, they find a negative correlation between 
inflation and the growth rate of real output. The 
possibility that inflation may lower output 
should not be too surprising, given that inflation 
is a tax on real cash balances. As  is the case with 
any other tax, we would expect increases in this 
tax to depress output. For example, higher rates 
of inflation cause people to engage in wasteful 
activities in order to economize on money hold- 
ings, thus senling to lower output. 
Because researchers cannot tell whether 
increases in money cause output to increase- 
and there is some evidence that illcreases in the 
growth rate of money actually depress output- 
how should policymakers proceed? Policy 
actions should be analyzed in light of their 
potential costs and benefits. Traditional Keynes- 
ian analysis assumes that all output fluctuations 
are inefficient and that policy could improve 
economic welfare by stabilizing output. How- 
ever, as Lucas (1987) points out, the welfare 
gains associated with smoothing business-cycle 
fluctuations are small and are dwarfed by the 
potential gains associated with increasing long- 
run economic growth. 
?he costs associated with stabilizing output 
may not be small. If  unanticipated money 
increases output as described by Lucas (1972, 
1977), then the real output effects from money 
are welfare-reducing. The reason is that the out- 
put effects of  money are generated by ~nisper- 
ceptions on the part of the public. As  Lucas 
points out, this analysis prescribes that the Fed- 
eral Resenre should follow a rule when conduct- 
ing monetary policy In Lucas's mcxfel, any out- 
put changes induced by money are inefficient. 
Eve11 if his reasons for why money affects ouitput 
are incorrect, it still may be best for policymakers 
to follow a rule. 
Stockman (1988) also makes the point that 
conducting policy as if  output fluctuations are 
inefficient can be damaging. If the true explana- 
tion of business cycles turns out to require both 
Keynesian and real business cycle elements, 
then there may be substantial welfare losses 
asstxiated with output stabilization.  As  argued by 
real business cycle theorists, some output 
changes are efficient. In aclclition, it is presently 
impossible to distinguish inefficient from effi- 
cient movements in output. lJsi13g  monetaqr pol- 
icy to offset these shocks could very well leave 
us worse off. Therefore, even if  money has real 
effects, it is not clear how aggressively, if at all, 
monetary policy should tnr to stabilize output. 
Policymakers should accept the possibility that 
money does not cause output. Instead of co11- 
ducting policy as if  money does cause output, 
they could base monetary policy on what we 
curre~ltly  know about its costs and benefits. The 
preceding analysis leads us to believe that poli- 
cyrnakers should be more reluctant to fine-tune 
the economy without understanding the ineffi- 
ciencies present in the economy. Because the 
costs of economic stabilization are thought to be 
large, while the potential benefits have bee12 
shown to be fairly small, we recommend that 
monetary policy be predicated on a rule that is 
easy for policymakers to implement and eve11 
easier for the public to monitor. 
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